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JOB NO. 78-04718A BOX NO. 71 FILE NO. 7 DOC. NO. 1 NO CHANGE
IN CLASS/ DECLASS/ CLASS CHANGED TO TS S/C RET. JUST. 22 18 November 1954 DD/S
NEXT REV DATE 189 REV DATE 3-7-72 REVIEWER 235932 TYPE DOC. 02
NO. PGS 13 CREATION DATE — ORG COMP 0070PI30 ORG CLASS S
REV CLASS — REV COORD. — AUTH: HR 70-3 73-4568

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Action Taken on the Doolittle Report

A. With Respect to Personnel

That the Agency personnel competence level be raised. The Agency should continually strive to achieve this and if necessary reduce its present work load to expedite its realization. Necessary steps are:

1. Elimination of personnel who can never achieve a sufficiently high degree of competence to meet the C.I.A. standard. This will entail a substantial reduction in present personnel. There is no place in C.I.A. for mediocrity.

Action: The "selection out" program is achieving the intent of this recommendation.

2. Review and improvement of recruitment plans and procedures in order to obtain higher quality applicants for Agency jobs. The time required to process them should be reduced.

Action: Implemented. We have substituted our Junior Officer Training program for the recruitment program which was in effect at the time of the Doolittle study. We believe that we are getting the highest quality personnel available.

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3. Continual improvement of the present excellent training facilities and capabilities in all covert activities to keep step with future requirements.

Action: Implemented. Our training facilities and capabilities have been constantly improving.

4. An intensified training program to include those key personnel in the covert services who require additional training, by rotation through C.I.A. training facilities. At present at least 10 percent of total covert personnel should be in training.

Action: Implemented, with the exception that we probably have never reached 10 percent of total covert personnel in training, but we have had five percent or better.

5. Assignment to field stations and to country areas of only those people who are fully qualified to handle the highly specialized problems involved.

Action: Implemented. We believe that our field assignments are almost without exception of the highest quality today.

6. Maintaining the position of Director above political considerations in order to assure tenure and continuity as in the F. B. I.

Action: Implemented.

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B. With Respect to Security

That greater security be developed at all levels of the Agency to the end that the good name of the United States and the fulfillment of C. I. A. 's important mission may not be jeopardized. The following steps should be taken to accomplish these objectives:

1. Elimination, to the maximum extent practicable, of provisional and preliminary clearances in the security processing of prospective Agency personnel.

Action: Implemented.

2. Improved and more standardized security processing of alien operational personnel prior to their use by the covert services overseas.

Action: Implemented. We have a standardized and improved method of operational clearances now in effect.

3. Immediate completion of full field investigations and polygraph examinations of the several hundred Agency personnel who have not yet been fully processed.

Action: Implemented.

4. Establishing of uniform and tighter security procedures at headquarters and suitable safeguards in the field the better to insure the security of the Agency's facilities, operations, sources and methods.

Action: Implemented.

5. Insurance of the closest possible coordination of the counterespionage activities of the covert services with the over-all counterintelligence activities

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of the Office of Security to prevent, or detect and eliminate, any penetrations of C. I. A.

Action: Implemented. With the creation of the CI Staff there has been an exceedingly close relationship between the Office of Security and the CI Staff.

6. Augmentation of the present sound policy of polygraphing all new employees and all personnel returning from overseas assignments to include periodic rechecks of all personnel, on a more comprehensive basis, whenever effective counterintelligence practices indicate.

Action: Implemented.

7. Creation of greater security consciousness on the part of all personnel by improving initial indoctrination courses and by conducting regular "security awareness" programs.

Action: Implemented. In fact, at this very moment a program is in effect whereby all employees of the Agency are required to attend a security indoctrination lecture; those who had been in the Agency the longest period of time were taken first, and it has worked forward to those most recently employed.

8. Imposition of severe penalties upon employees at any and all levels who advertently or inadvertently violate security.

Action: Implemented.

9. Establishment of a uniform system for the submission by all overseas missions of regular reports on the status of personnel, physical, documentary

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and related elements of security. Such reports should be submitted to the Office of Security with copies to the Inspector General and to the appropriate division of the Deputy Director of Plans.

Action: The intent of this recommendation has been accomplished without requiring regular security reports from overseas stations. The sum total of the reports received plus the regular inspections by the Inspector General, the I & R Staff, DD/P, the Office of Security, at cetera, accomplishes the intent.

10. Periodic security inspections by the Security Office of overseas missions and of DD/P's divisions, staffs and facilities in the United States.

Action: Implemented.

11. Rigid adherence to the "need-to-know" requirement as the basis for dissemination of classified intelligence developed by the covert services and for intra-Agency dissemination of classified data.

Action: Implemented and subject to regular review.

12. Continuous indoctrination and guidance to correct the natural tendency to overclassify documents originating in the Agency.

Action: Implemented and subject to regular review.

13. Promulgation of definitive standards and procedures governing cover for the guidance of all personnel. There should be a continuing program of monitoring cover in foreign installations. Personnel departing for overseas assignments should be more adequately briefed concerning the importance of cover generally, and in particular their mission and personal cover.

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Action: This is a program which has received considerable attention over the last several years. We feel that we have developed better standards and procedures governing cover, now have good briefings for both personnel and their wives, and do continually monitor our cover in foreign installations.

14. Insurance that officials of proprietary organizations adhere to C.I.A.'s security regulations in order to avoid disclosure, breach, or compromise of the Agency's covert association with such organizations.

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Action: Implemented. (See above.)

16. Formulation for immediate implementation of emergency plans and preparations, geared to the specific needs of each overseas mission and station, to insure, as far as possible, adequate safeguarding of personnel and safeguarding or destruction of material, in the event of emergency.

Action: Implemented. Each station now has an emergency evacuation plan.

17. Concentration of C.I.A.'s headquarters operations in fewer buildings with increased emphasis in the interim on improvement of the physical

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security of C. I. A. 's many buildings and the classified data and materials contained therein.

Action: In process of implementation through the construction of a C. I. A. building.

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That one agency be charged with the coordination of all covert operations in peacetime, subject to the provision that necessary flexibility be achievable in time of war. The covert operating capabilities of C.I.A. must be continually improved. Steps toward these ends are:

1. Implementation of NSC 5412 which now makes C.I.A. the coordinating agency pending a national emergency.

Action: Implemented. The establishment of the 5412 Committee and its procedures has fully accomplished the intent of this recommendation.

2. Preparation and test of a readily implementable plan for the immediate and effective availability of local covert assets to theater commanders at the outbreak of war in their areas.

Action: The process of implementing this has been a matter of considerable exchange of ideas both with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theatre commanders.

3. Immediate resolution, by the National Security Council, of the misunderstandings that still exist between C.I.A. and some of the Armed Services with respect to "agreed activities."


Action: The new NSCID-5 and its DCID's should go a long way toward resolving the last of the so-called agreed activities issues.

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5. A greater interchange of information, at all working levels, between C. I. A. and the military services regarding their intelligence programs and policies.

Action: Implemented. There is considerably greater exchange of information between C. I. A. and the military services today than there was in 1954.

6. Improvement at all levels of coordination of C. I. A. covert activities with the State Department.

Action: Implemented. The so-called Reams Office has improved the coordination with State.

7. Establishment of definite world-wide objectives for the future, and formulation of a comprehensive long-range plan for their achievement.

Action: The Related Mission Directives for each station establishes worldwide objectives along the line of the National Intelligence Objectives. Whether this would satisfy the Doolittle recommendation for a comprehensive long-range plan is open to question.

8. Use, in all areas, of governmental cover by C. I. A. personnel only when other cover is not suitable or cannot be made available.

Action: We have been attempting to accomplish the intent of this recommendation and the DD/P strongly endeavors to hold down the amount of governmental cover.

9. Active development of non-governmental cover.

Action: Implemented. Considerable progress on this has been made by the Central Cover Division.

10. The planting of agents under very deep cover in all areas including those that may not be of immediate interest, and the careful preservation of such assets.

Action: Whether this recommendation has been implemented could be debated. We have established many agents under very deep cover but the great majority of them must be used for current operations.

11. More effective use of "proprietary project" cover through better planning and by using personnel having adequate business and area experience.

Action: Implemented. We are now making quite effective use of proprietary cover.

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D. With Respect to Organization and Administration

That an intensive organizational study be made to the end of streamlining functions, clarifying lines of responsibility and authority, reducing overhead and increasing efficiency and effectiveness. From our relatively brief examination of organization it is obvious that:

1. The present elaborate staff structure of the Deputy Director for Plans should be simplified.

Action: The DD/P staff structure has been changed since 1954-- (a) by the creation of the CI Staff as an independent senior staff; (b) by the considerable modification and simplification of the PP Staff; (c) by the grouping together under Operational Services such elements as the Air Maritime Division, the Intelligence Support Division, the Registry, et cetera. Whether this accomplishes the intent of the Doolittle recommendation is open to question although it does answer at least one of their suggestions in their proposed organization chart.

2. The covert organization should be so located, organized and administered as to maintain maximum security with reference to personnel and activities.

Action: The location of the covert organization has not changed since 1954.

3. The Inspector General should operate on an Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility to investigate and report on all activities of the Agency.

Action: Implemented.

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4. The activities of the Operations Coordination Board under the N.S.C. should be broadened to provide the D.C.I. with adequate support on the more important covert projects.

Action: Implemented.

5. Despite the recommended reduction in present personnel and budgetary economies that the C.I.A. must continue to grow in capacity until it is able to meet, entirely, its national commitments.

Action: This could be debated at some length, although both the personnel and the budget have more or less stabilized and the efficiency of the Agency has obviously increased. It is questionable as to whether it is the size that the Doolittle committee had in mind.

6. Centralized accommodations, hand-tailored to its needs, should be provided to house the Agency.

Action: In process of implementation through the construction of a C.I.A. building.

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E. With Respect to Cost Factors

That although the activities of C.I.A. should be expanded, costs of present operations should be reduced. This can be in part, accomplished through:

1. The exercise of better control over expenditures for all covert projects, and specifically that (except for those of an extremely sensitive nature) they be made subject to review and approval by the Agency's Project Review Committee.

Action: Implemented.

2. Furnishing the Comptroller (under proper security provisions) with sufficient information on all covert projects to enable him to exercise proper accounting control on a fiscal year basis.

Action: The Comptroller now receives considerably more information on covert projects than formerly. Whether this is as much as this recommendation intends is subject to interpretation.

[Redacted Signature]

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General

(Dictated but not read by LBK)

cc: DDCI
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